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Notes
Life After Adarand:
The Future is Not So Clear
Adarand Constructors,Inc. v. Pena'
I. INTRODUCTION
African-American scholar and statesman W.E.B. DuBois "predicted in
1908 that the question of this century would be the 'color-line,' meaning the
relations between the white and African-American races."2 His prediction
came true in American politics as well as American constitutional
jurisprudence. Affirmative action programs designed to remedy past wrongs
against African-Americans, other minorities, and women have come under
considerable attack in the last ten years. The Supreme Court of the United
States has now decided in Adarandthat any such program, whether federal,
state, or local, must be analyzed with strict scrutiny to determine if it violates
the Equal Protection Clause. In so doing, the Court dramatically changed the
landscape of affirmative action programs in this country.
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
Mountain Gravel & Construction Company was awarded the prime
contract on a federally funded highway construction project in 1989.2 Federal
law required that a subcontracting clause be included in the prime contract,
which provided that Mountain Gravel would receive additional compensation
if it awarded subcontracts to certain small, socially disadvantaged businesses.4
The required clause further provided for presumptions of "socially
disadvantaged" individuals, which included "Black Americans, Hispanic
Americans, Native Americans, Asian Pacific Americans, and other minorities
or any other individual found5 to be disadvantaged by ... section 8(a) of the
Small Business Act (SBA).
Pursuant to provisions of the SBA, companies found to be disadvantaged
under section 8(a) have automatic eligibility for subcontractor provisions such

1. 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995).
2. John C. Brittain, Developments in Human Rights Law, CONN. LAW TRIBUNE,
Dec. 25, 1995, at 16A.
3. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2102.

4. Id
5. Id
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as the one in Mountain Gravel's contract.6 In order to receive the additional
compensation provided for in the prime contract, companies like Mountain
Gravel only needed to award the subcontracts to such a "socially
disadvantaged" business.7
Mountain Gravel opened a bidding process for the guardrail portion of
the highway project.8 Adarand Constructors, Inc. submitted the low bid on the
project, but was not qualified as a socially disadvantaged business.9 Gonzales
submitted a higher bid, but qualified under the applicable statutes as a
"socially disadvantaged" business.1 Mountain Gravel awarded the contract to
Gonzales, stating that it would have accepted Adarand's bid had it not been
for the additional compensation it would receive by awarding the contract to
Gonzales."
Having lost the contract, Adarand filed suit in the Federal District Court
in Colorado against various federal officials, alleging that the presumptions set
up by the SBA violated the Equal Protection Clause." The District Court
granted the government's motion for summary judgment, and the Tenth
Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed.' The Tenth Circuit, applying the "lenient"
standard of review set out in Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. Federal
CommunicationsCommission, 4 upheld the use of the additional compensation
clauses for awarding subcontractsto disadvantaged businesses.'" The Supreme
Court of the United States granted certiorari to reevaluate the standard of
review employed by the Tenth Circuit. 6
In a five-four decision, a majority determined that strict scrutiny should
be applied to racial classifications imposed by the federal government. 7 The
Court stated that this standard would apply to both benign and invidious
classifications because of the difficulty in discerning the difference.'
In
holding that strict scrutiny applied in the federal context, the Court expressly
overruled Metro Broadcasting.9

6. Id.
7. Id at 2104.
8. Id. at 2102.
9. Id.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 2104.
Id.
497 U.S. 547 (1990).
Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2104.
Id at 2104-05.
Id. at 2113.
Id. at 2112.

19. Id. at 2113 (overruling Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol61/iss4/5
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III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The Equal Protection Clause' applies to state governments directly
through the Fourteenth Amendment, and to the federal government through
operation of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.2' The Equal
Protection Clause guarantees that similarly situated people will be treated
similarly; conversely, citizens not similarly situated for equal protection
purposes may be treated differently.' One commentator has stated that "the
equal protection guarantee has become the single most important concept in
the Constitution for the protection of individual rights."'
In the individual rights context, state and federal governments implicate
the equal protection guarantee whenever they seek to apply their laws based
upon racial classifications. The Supreme Court has employed equal protection
analysis in the context of racial classifications several times in the past fifty
years, but clear standards have yet to develop. What is clear, however, is that
selection of the standard of review used to analyze the classifications is the
single most important decision the Court makes in these cases.24 The higher
the standard of review, the more difficult it is for the law being analyzed to
The highest standard of review in equal
pass constitutional muster."

(1990), which held that benign federal racial classifications need only satisfy
intermediate scrutiny).
20. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
21. See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 93 (1976) (stating that Equal
Protection analysis is the same under the Fourteenth and Fifth Amendments).
22. LAWRENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTrrTUTIONAL LAW, § 16-1 at 1438 (2d
ed. 1988).
23. JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, § 14.1 at
595 (5th ed. 1995).
24. The vaiying levels of review used by courts in modem constitutional
jurisprudence is thought to come from footnote four of United States v. Carolene
Products Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938). See generally Lewis F. Powell Jr., Carolene
Products Revisited, 82 COLUm. L. REv. 1087 (1982).
25. Three standards of review are employed in the equal protection

context-rational basis, intermediate review, and strict scrutiny. NOWAK & ROTUNDA,
supra note 23, § 14.3, at 601-06.
Rational basis is the least rigorous standard of review. Id. at 601. It is most
often used in analyzing economic legislation, and the Court merely asks whether the
law is rationally related to a legitimate goal of the government. Id,
Courts utilize intermediate review to analyze quasi-suspect classifications, such
at 603. Under this standard, the Court
as those based on illegitimacy and gender. Id.
relationship to an important
substantial
has
a
if
it
will uphold the classification
governmental interest. Id
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1996
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protection analysis is strict scrutiny, which, afterAdarand,applies to all racial
classifications. This standard requires that the law be narrowly tailored to
serve a compelling governmental interest, and that the law do so through the
least restrictive means possible needed to achieve that interest.2 6 Few laws
can, or have, cleared this constitutional hurdle.
One of the early modem decisions regarding racial classifications in the
equal protection area was Korematsu v. United States.27 In Korematsu, the
Court upheld Civil Exclusion Order No. 34 under the (then implicit) equal
protection component of the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause.28 Order
No. 34, passed by Congress after the United States declared war on Japan,
required Japanese-Americans to report to relocation camps at the direction of
military officials.29 The Court justified the order on the grounds of wartime
necessity and fears of espionage." Before upholding the order, however, the
Court stated that "all legal restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a single
racial group are immediately suspect... [and warrant] the most rigid scrutiny
[by the courts]."'" This language gave the first indication that laws which
operated on the basis of race required strict scrutiny to survive an equal
protection challenge.
The Court's next word on the appropriate standard of review for
classifications based solely upon race came in Boiling v. Sharpe.32 The
Boiling Court decided the constitutionality of segregation of AfricanAmericans in the District of Columbia schools.33 That same day, the Court
handed down Brown v. Board of Education,34 which held segregation in state

Finally, the most heightened scrutiny of a classification occurs when the Court
employs strict scrutiny, where it asks whether the classification is the least restrictive
means to serve a compelling governmental interest. Id.
at 601-02. Classifications
analyzed under this standard include those based on race and national origin. Id at
602.
26. See supra note 25.
27. 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
28. Id.
at 223. The Court did not discuss the then-current view that the Fifth
Amendment did not afford protection from discriminatory legislation promulgated by
the federal government. See Detroit Bank v. United States, 317 U.S. 329, 337 (1943).
The Court has changed its view on this, and now implies an equal protection
component into the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause. See supra note 21 and
accompanying text.
29. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 216-22.
30. Id. at 223.
31. Id. at 216.
32. 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
33. Id. at 498.
34. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol61/iss4/5
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schools violative of the Fourteenth Amendment.35 The Court in Boiling held
the segregation unconstitutional by implying an equal protection component
into the Fifth Amendment.3 6 Regarding the standard of review, the Court
stated that "[c]lassifications based solely on race must be scrutinized with
particular care, since they are contrary to our traditions and hence
constitutionally suspect."37 The Court then, somewhat confusingly, applied

a rational-basis standard and held the segregation unconstitutional, as it did not
serve any "proper governmental objective."38
In Loving v. Virginia,39 the Court spoke on the appropriate standard of
review under the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause for state
laws based on racial classifications. Loving involved a challenge to the
Virginia anti-miscegenation statute.4" Citing Korematsu, the Court asserted
that "racial classifications . . . [must] be subject to the 'most rigid

scrutiny'." 4 Under that standard, the Court struck down the Virginia
statutory scheme.42
The Court's next major opinion on racial classifications also involved
state law. In Board of Regents of the University of Californiav. Bakke,43 the
Court decided the constitutionality of an admissions program instituted by the
University of California-Davis medical school designed to benefit minorities
by giving them a preference in the application process.' Justice Powell, in
a separate opinion, stated that "[r]acial and ethnic distinctions of any sort are
inherently suspect and thus call for the most exacting judicial examination."4 5
It was argued in Bakke that "benign" racial discrimination46 could not be

35. Id. at 495. The Court in Boiling stated that "[i]n view of [the] decision that
the Constitution prohibits the states from maintaining racially segregated public
schools, it would be unthinkable that the same Constitution would impose a lesser duty
on the Federal Government." Boiling, 347 U.S. at 500.
36. Boiling, 347 U.S. at 500.

at 499.
37. Id.
at 500.
38. Id.
39. 388 U.S. 1 (1907).
at 2. These statutes made interracial marriages unlawful.
40. Id.
41. Loving, 388 U.S. at 11 (citing Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214,216
(1994)).
42. Id.
43. 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (plurality opinion).
at 269-70.
44. Id.
45. Id at 291.
46. "Benign" discrimination is the label given to remedial discriminatory
measures, such as the type involved in Bakke (discrimination against white applicant).
at 294-95.
Id.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1996
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suspect, but Justice Powel 47 disagreed and proceeded to apply strict scrutiny
to the discriminatory admissions scheme.48 Powell acknowledged that the
State has a substantial interest "in ameliorating. .. the disabling effects of
identified discrimination,"49 but held the admissions program at issue
unnecessary to fulfill that objective."
The program thus violated the
Fourteenth Amendment.'
The constitutionality of a federal statute employing racial classifications
came under review two years later in Fullilove v. Klutznick
The federal
statute, the Public Works Employment Act of 1977, required prime contractors
on federally funded projects to award at least ten percent of the federal monies
3
granted for the employment of a "minority business enterprise" (MBE).
The Court, through Chief Justice Burger, stated that racial classifications
warrant "a most searching examination to make sure that it does not conflict
with constitutional guarantees."' In this case, however, the Court expressed
deference to the federal statute at issue as a "considered decision of the
Congress and the President,""5 implying that federal legislation utilizing
racial classifications would be subject to something less than strict scrutiny.
Burger went on to hold the statute constitutional, but refused to expressly
adopt a particular standard of review appropriate for federal statutes.5 6 The
Chief Justice evaded the issue by stating that this statute would pass either
intermediate or strict scrutiny.57 Justice Rehnquist (now Chief Justice) joined

47. Bakke did not produce a majority opinion. At the time, though, four Justices
would have treated benign racial classifications differently. Id. at 359 (Brennan,
White, Marshall, and Blackmun, JJ., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in
part.)
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

Bakke, 438 U.S. at 295.
Id. at 307.
Id. at 320.
Id.
448 U.S. 448 (1980).
Id. at 453-55. A MBE was defined for publicly owned companies as one

owned by over fifty percent minorities. "Minorities" were further defined as "Negroes,
Spanish-speaking, Orientals, Indians, Eskimos, and Aleuts." Id. at 454.
54. Id. at 491.
55. Id. at 473.
56. Id. at 492.

57. Id. The test actually employed in the case was a two-part inquiry: (1)
"whether the objectives of th[e] legislation are within the power of Congress" and (2)
"whether the limited use of racial and ethnic criteria, in the context presented, is a
constitutionally permissible means of achieving the congressional objectives." Id. at
473.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol61/iss4/5
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Justice Stewart in dissent, arguing that the federal government should be
bound by the same standard as state governments. 8
Six years later, the Court decided another state racial classification
scheme in Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education.9 In Wygant, the Board
of Education (Board) entered into a collective-bargaining agreement with a
teachers' union that provided minority employees a retention preference in
determining future layoffs.' A plurality of the Court concluded that the
program violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment." Justice Powell, writing for the plurality, stated that to pass
constitutional muster the program would have to survive strict scrutiny; a
compelling state purpose and narrowly tailored means would have to be
shown.62 The Board's stated purpose was to remedy past discrimination
against minorities, 63 but the Court never reached the issue of whether such
a purpose was "compelling."' Instead, Justice Powell decided that the means
selected-the giving of preferential treatment in layoff decisions to minority
teachers-was not sufficiently narrow to satisfy the Fourteenth Amendment.65
The latest word from the Court on the standard of review for state
programs with racial classifications came in City of Richmond v. JA.Croson
Company.66 The city program in Croson required a thirty percent set-aside
to MBE's on city construction contracts.67 Regarding the standard of review
appropriate for evaluating the constitutionality of the program, a majority of
the Court stated that a discriminatory state program would have to pass strict
scrutiny. The benign nature of the discriminatory program at issue made

58.
59.
60.
61.

Id. at 523.
476 U.S. 267 (1986).
Id at 270-71.
Id at 283. This part of the plurality opinion by Justice Powell was joined by

Chief Justice Burger, Justice Rehnquist, and Justice O'Connor.

62. Wygant, 476 U.S. at 274.
at 277.
63. Id.
64. Justice Powell did state that "[s]ocietal discrimination, without more, is too
amorphous a basis for imposing a racially classified remedy." Id. at 276.
65. Id. at 284.
66. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
67. Id at 477-78.
68. Justice O'Connor, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice White, wrote
the plurality opinion which applied strict scrutiny. Id. at 492-94. The concurring
opinions of Justice Kennedy and Justice Scalia were in agreement with the plurality
regarding the appropriate standard of review. Id at 518 (Kennedy J., concurring); id
at 520 (Scalia, J., concurring). This opinion finally resolved the previous failure of
a majority of the Court to decide on the proper level of scrutiny to give a remedial
racial classification imposed by a state government.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1996
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no difference to the majority."9 The Court further stated that remedying
"societal discrimination" would not suffice as a compelling state interest.70
Rather, the municipality would have to show that it was remedying past
discrimination it which it engagedto have a compelling interest in the racially
classified program.7'
With the issue now ripe for decision in the context of Congressional
affirmative action, the Court accepted certiorari to decide the fate of a
remedial federal program based upon racial classifications one year later in
Metro Broadcasting,Inc. v. Federal Communications Commission.72 The
Court, in a five-four decision, held that intermediate review was the proper
standard of review for a benign federal discriminatory program. The program
would be upheld if it served important governmental objectives and the means
employed substantially related to those objectives.73 The Court justified the
different standard for federal programs on the grounds that the Court must
accord more deference to the national legislature and administrative agencies
than to state governments.74 At issue were minority-preference programs of
the F.C.C., which prioritized minorities in the application process for radio
and television licenses.75 The important governmental interest being served
by the programs was the promotion of "minority participation in the
'
broadcasting industry. 76
The Court found the two programs constitutional
standard of review. 77
intermediate
the
under
The jurisprudence that culminated in Croson and Metro Broadcasting
indicated that two standards of review were to be employed in determining
whether a racial classification scheme violated the constitution-intermediate
review for federal programs and strict scrutiny for state programs. 78 This
choice of standards would inevitably lead to more state affirmative-action
programs being struck down than federal programs.

69. Croson, 488 U.S. at 494.
70. Id. at 498-507 (Justice O'Connor, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice
Kennedy, Justice Stevens, and Justice White).
71. Croson, 488 U.S. at 504. The Court distinguished Fullilove by stating that
the federal statute involved in that case was based upon national findings of societal
discrimination. The Court found this type of finding to be too broad to justify
Richmond's plan, however, and required Richmond to make findings of past
discrimination in its own jurisdiction to justify remedial measures. Id.
72. 497 U.S. 547 (1990).
73. Id. at 564.
74. Id. at 563.
75. Id. at 556-57.
76. Id. at 552-53.
77. Id. at 596-97.
78. See supra notes 68, 73 and accompanying text.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol61/iss4/5
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During the five years after Metro Broadcasting,the composition of the
Court changed. Justice Thomas joined the dissenters in Metro Broadcasting
to pass judgment once again on the appropriate standard of review for federal
affirmative action programs79 in Adarand Constructors,Inc. v. Pena. °
IV. INSTANT DECISION
Justice O'Connor, writing for the majority, began by confronting the
question of whether Adarand had standing to seek prospective injunctive
relief.8' The Court decided that Adarand had standing to seek such relief,
and moved on to the all-important question of the appropriate standard of
review."
Justice O'Connor surveyed relevant case law and then noted that the
Court had read the equal protection principles inherent in the Fourteenth
Amendment into the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause, under which
Adarand's federal complaint arose. 3 The Court stated that "[e]qual
protection analysis in the Fifth Amendment area is the same as that under the
Fourteenth Amendment." 4 Thus, O'Connor stated the federal program at
issue in Adarand was subject to an equal protection analysis."
The Court then began consideration of the appropriate standard of review
to employ when evaluating the constitutionality of a federally mandated racial
classification. 6 The Court noted that in Richmond v. J.A. Croson
Company, 7 it had resolved this issue with respect to racial classifications by
state governments under the Fourteenth Amendment. 8 In Croson, a majority
79. Dissenting in Metro Broadcastingwere Chief Justice Rehnquist along with
Justices O'Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy. With Justice Thomas's vote, these five
justices comprised the majority decision in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S.
Ct. 2097 (1995).
80. 115 S.Ct. 2097 (1995).
81. Id. at 2104. This issue was raised because Adarand was specifically
requesting prospective injunctive relief regarding the set-aside programs. Id. The
Court decided that Adarand had made an adequate showing of a potential invasion of
a legally protected interest which was concrete and particularized, and such invasion
was actual or imminent, as required by Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555,
560 (1992).
82. Adarand, 115 S.Ct. at 2105-06.
83. Id.
at 2108.
84. Id. at 2108 (quoting United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 166 n.16
(1987)).
85. Id.
86. Id.

87. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
88. Adarand, 115 S.Ct. at 2110.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1996
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of the Court decided that strict scrutiny should be employed for such
classifications.8 9
The majority noted that the Court's cases through Croson established
three general propositions regarding racial classifications imposed by the
government." These three propositions were skepticism, consistency, and
congruence.9' "Skepticism" related to the Court's opinions which had
determined that all racial classifications were inherently suspect, thus
deserving of high scrutiny.92 "Consistency," O'Connor observed, resulted
from the Court deciding that all racial classifications must be subject to
heightened scrutiny, regardless of the intent behind such classification.93
Finally, "congruence" resulted from the Court's application of Fourteenth
Amendment Equal Protection jurisprudence under the Fifth Amendment Due
Process Clause, so as to make the standards applicable to the federal and state
governments identical.94 Justice O'Connor stated that these propositions
together,
lead to the conclusion that any person, of whatever race, has the right to
demand that any governmental actor subject to the Constitution justify any
racial classification subjecting that person to unequal treatment under the
strictest judicial scrutiny.95
96 and decided that
The Court then considered Metro Broadcasting,
opinion "squarely rejected" the proposition of congruence which had been
established by the Court's earlier cases.97 Metro Broadcasting did this by
establishing a different standard of review for state and federal racial
classifications. 98 The Court believed that in so doing, Metro Broadcasting
undermined the other propositions of skepticism and consistency.99
Accordingly, the majority overruled Metro Broadcastingby holding that

89. Id.
90. Id at 2111.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. 497 U.S. 547 (1990) (subjecting racial classifications imposed by the federal
government to only intermediate scrutiny).
97. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2112.
98. Id.
99. Id.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol61/iss4/5
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all racial classifications, imposed by whatever federal, state, or local
governmental actor, must be analyzed by a reviewing court under strict

scrutiny. In other words, such classifications are constitutional only if they
are narrowly tailored measures that further compelling governmental

interests.' °

Justice O'Connor wrote that "[b]y refusing to follow Metro Broadcasting,
then, we do not depart from the fabric of the law; we restore it."''
In closing the majority opinion, Justice O'Connor stated that the Court
wished to dispel the notion that strict scrutiny was "strict in theory, fatal in
fact.' 0 2 She stated that:
[t]he unhappy persistence of both the practice and the lingering effects of
racial discrimination against minority groups in this country is an
unfortunate reality, and government is not disqualified from acting in
response to it . ..When race-based action is necessary to further a

compelling interest, such action is within constitutional constraints if it
the "narrow tailoring" test this Court has set out in previous
satisfies
103
cases.

The Court then remanded the case to the District Court for a
determination of whether the subcontractor clause at issue passed strict
scrutiny.' 4
In a concurring opinion, Justice Scalia agreed with Justice O'Connor
regarding the appropriate standard of review for analyzing racial classifications
Justice Scalia went further, however,
imposed by the federal government.'
and stated that a government could "never have a 'compelling interest' in
discriminating on the basis of race in order to 'make up' for past racial
that our
discrimination in the opposite direction."'" Justice Scalia stated
07
Constitution does not contemplate "debtor" and "creditor" races.
In his concurrence, Justice Thomas'" wrote that "governmentsponsored discrimination based on benign prejudice is just as noxious as

100. Id. at 2113.
at 2116.
101. Id.
at 2117 (quoting Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 519 (1980)).
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id at 2118.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id

at 2119.
108. Id.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1996
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discrimination inspired by malicious prejudice."' 9 He stated that "[i]n each
instance, it is discrimination, plain and simple. " "'
In dissent, Justice Stevens criticized the majority's departure from Metro
Broadcasting."' Justice Stevens also criticized Justice O'Connor's
propositions of skepticism, consistency, and congruence."' Finally, Justice
Stevens discussed stare decisis,"' and concluded that he would have
affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals." 4
V. COMMENT
A. Present Effects ofAdarand
Adarand drastically alters the landscape with respect to federal
affirmative action programs. The decision has affected minority businesses, the
executive branch of the federal government (especially administrative agencies
such as the Federal Communications Commission), the Congress, and, of
course, the lower federal courts. In addition, state legislatures have been
influenced by the decision, and various commentators have leveled criticism
at the Court. The "ripple effects" of this decision are still being felt
throughout all forms of affirmative action programs, and the decision has
produced much commentary." 5

109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id, at 2127 (Stevens, J., dissenting joined by Justice Ginsburg).
112. Id, at 2120-27.
113. Id.at 2126-28.
114. Id.at 2131. Justice Souter and Justice Ginsburg also authored dissenting
opinions. Id.at 2131, 2134. Justice Souter stated that he agreed with Justice Steven's
views regarding stare decisis, and would have followed precedent. Id at 2133-34.
Justice Ginsburg believed that the majority's opinion constituted judicial activism, and
that the Court should have deferred to the political branches. Id.at 2134-36.
115. See, e.g., Koteles Alexander, Adarand: Brute PoliticalForce Concealedas
a Constitutional Colorblind Principle, 39 How. L.J. 367 (1995) (criticizing the
decision as based upon political motivations rather than any rule of law); Sameer M.
Ashar & Lisa F. Opoku, Justice O'Connor's Blind Rationalization of Affirmative
Action Jurisprudence-AdarandConstructors, Inc. v. Pena, 31 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REv. 223 (1996) (criticizing the adoption of strict scrutiny for all racial classifications);
Donald L. Beschle, "You've Got to be Carefully Taught": JustifyingAffirmative Action
After Croson and Adarand, 74 N.C. L. REv. 1141 (1996) (arguing that social science
supports affirmative action); Danielle Conway-Jones & Christoper L. Jones, Jr.,
Departmentof Defense ProcurementPracticesAfter Adarand: What Lies Aheadfor
the Largest Purchaserof Goods and Services and Its Base of Small Disadvantaged
Contractors, 39 How. L.J. 391 (1995) (discussing impact of Adarand on defense
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol61/iss4/5
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The President initially responded to the Adarand decision by ordering the
Department of Justice to review all federal affirmative action programs to
determine their viability." 6 The Justice Department issued a memorandum
on February 29, 1996, in an attempt to give guidance to federal agencies
regarding affirmative action programs." 7 The memo began by stating that

procurement contracting since the demise of the "rule of two"); Patricia A. Carlson,
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena: The LochnerizationofAffirmative Action, 27 ST.
MARY'S L.J. 423 (1996) (comparing Adarand to judicial activism of Lochner era);
E'Vinski Davis, Note, Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena: Turning Back the Clock
on Minority Set-Asides, 23 S.U. L. REv. 79 (1995) (criticizing the court for deviating
from precedent); Neal Devins, Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena and the Continuing
IrrelevanceofSupreme Court Affirmative Action Decisions,37 WM. & MARY L. REV.
673 (1996) (arguing that the Court's decisions, including Adarand, have little effect
on affirmative action programs); Karen B. Dietrich, Note, FederalAffirmative Action
After Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 74 N.C. L. REv. 1259 (1996) (arguing that
Adarand permits the continued use of limited affirmative action programs); Brian C.
Eades, Note, The United States Supreme Court Goes Color-Blind: Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 29 CREiGHTON L. REv. 771 (1996) (supporting result in
Adarand by arguing that affirmative action is inconsistent with Equal Protection);
Charles J. Falletta, Note, Fifth andFourteenthAmendments-DueProcess and Equal
Protection-FederalAffirmativeAction Programs,Like Those of a State..., 6 SETON
HALL CONST. L.J. 295 (1995) (reporting on Adarand and predicting on the possible
effects of the decision); Leslie Gentile, Note, Giving Effect to Equal Protection:
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 29 AKRON L. REv. 397 (1996) (criticizing the
Court's focus on process rather than on outcomes in the affirmative action context);
Rheba C. Heggs, Practitioner'sViewpoint: What to Expect After Adarand, 25 PuB.
CONT. L.J. 451 (1996) (predicting new uncertainty in federal set-asides will increase
work for agency and private attorneys litigating over the programs); Terrence M.
Lewis, Comment, Standardof Review Under the Fifth Amendment Equal Protection
Component: Adarand Expands the Application ofStrictScrutiny, 34 DUQ. L. REv. 325
(1996) (criticizing the Court's "conservative" approach to affirmative action); Stephen
C. Minnich, Comment, Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena-A Strict Scrutiny of
Affirmative Action, 46 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 279 (1995) (supporting the result in
Adarand as a positive step towards decreasing the significance of race); William P.
Pendley, Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena: Reflections on an Appearance Before
the United States Supreme Court,31 LAND & WATER L. REv. 561 (1996) (plaintiff's
lawyer reflecting on Adarand); Donna Thompson-Schneider, Paved With Good
Intentions: Affirmative Action After Adarand?, 31 TULSA L.J. 611 (1996) (predicting
that Adarandwill encourage protracted litigation); Jerome R. Watson and Akinyale
Harrison, Government Contracting: Affirmative Action After Adarand, 74 MICH. B.J.
1162 (1995) (stating that the affect of Adarand is not clear as the strict scrutiny
standard adopted was not applied by the Court).
116. Steven G. Reade & Rosemary Maxwell, Labor Law, THE NATIONAL LAW
JOURNAL, Feb. 19, 1996, at B6-7.
117. Justice Department Memo on Post-AdarandAffirmative Action Guidance,
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the Clinton administration strongly supports affirmative action (AA) programs
and planned to continue its efforts in the area." 8 It stated that racially-based
decision making is defensible after Adarandif the agency has a "demonstrable
factual predicate for its actions" such as statistical evidence of past
discrimination by that agency (through a "disparity study") or a legitimate
operational need for minority representation." 9 One example given of such
an operational need was the need for minority police officers in order to
achieve the community support required for the effective law enforcement in
Further, the Justice Department advised that any
various communities.'
The memo
programs should be narrow in scope and limited in time.'
comports with President Clinton's belief that although some programs need
work, he does not believe it is necessary to end all affirmative action.
Ironically, in the months since the February memorandum was issued by
the Justice Department, a new industry has been born to help governments
friendly toward AA justify their programs underAdarand-the disparity study
business. Terry Eastland, author of a new book entitled Ending Affirmative
Action: The Case for ColorblindJustice, reports that "the disparity study

industry has become big business."" In fact, this "business" has cost U.S.
taxpayers $45 million. 4 Despite the money being spent, Eastland argues
the studies are result-oriented; disparity is often found. 5 In a study
conducted in Oregon, no actual cases of discrimination in government
contracting were found, but the study found "discrimination" nonetheless.' 26
Eastland is not surprised by this-he says that "[tlhe whole point of these
disparity studies is to find discrimination."' 27
Despite the Justice Department's memo in support of AA programs, the
Clinton administration ordered a three-year moratorium on any new set-aside

DAILY LABOR REPORT,

March 5, 1996 at D31, available in LEXIS, News Library,

Dlabrt File.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Claude R. Marx, Will Race Surface as an Issue?Not Now, But Clinton Faces
GOPAttacks in Fall, INVESTORS BUSINESS DAILY, Feb. 23, 1996, at A1, available in

WESTLAW, 1996 WL 3586948 (The President was quoted as saying "Mend it, don't
end it.").
123. David Reinhard, Eastland's Case for Colorblind Justice, PORTLAND

OREGONIAN, July 25, 1996, at D08, available in WESTLAW, 1996 WL 4162596.
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programs. 8 As for the existing affirmative action programs, though, one
report indicated that months later "all 165 federal affirmative action programs
are still in place."' 9
To further his goal of continuing AA, the President announced that he
was considering signing an executive order near the end of 1995.30 The
order would establish "empowerment contracting," which focuses on
economics, rather than race or gender criteria, when aiding businesses with
evaluation preferences to help them give competitive bids for federal
contracts. 3' A business would qualify for such preferences if it was
"located in an 'area of general economic distress' or if it employs 'a
significant number of residents' from such an area."'3
The Secretary of
Commerce would determine what areas qualify to be considered of "general
economic distress," using such factors as "unemployment rate, degree of
poverty, rate of business formation, and rate of business growth."' 33 Race
would not be a factor in awarding the contracts. Rather, geographic criteria
would determine what companies were eligible.' The order was signed on
3
May 21, 1996. 1
President Clinton, in addition to pursuing the above-described executive
order, has employed a different strategy for his administration in its continued
support of AA programs-avoiding any substantial changes in the majority of
the current programs. One editorial writer stated that "Bill Clinton's policy on
racial preferences has always been to deceive the people by talking moderately
while ordering bureaucrats to run as far left as possible." 3 6 Clinton's
"policy" has been implemented in many ways, the most pronounced of which
is the notice of proposed reforms to AA programs recently promulgated by the
Department of Justice.

128. Moratorium Called on Minority Contract Program, NEW YORK TIMES,
March 8, 1996, at Al.
129. TheAffirmativeActionDilemma,INVESTORS BUSINESS DAILY, June 17, 1996
at A2, available in WESTLAW, 1996 WL 10195788 [hereinafter The Affirmative
Action Dilemna].
130. Draft EO on Empowerment ContractingWould Tie Preference to Location,
DAILY REPORT FOR EXECUTIVES, Oct. 2, 1995 at Section A, at 190, available in
LEXIS, News Library, Drexec File.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id
135. Government Contracts,Administration Expected to Propose Empowerment
ContractingInitiative, DAILY REPORT FOR EXECUTIVES, Sept. 13, 1996, Section A,
available in LEXIS, News Library, Drexec File.
136. Greg Forster, ChangeEverything,Don'tChangeA Thing, THE WASHINGTON
TIMES, April 11, 1996, at A17, available in LEXIS, News Library, Wtimes File.
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On May 23, 1996, the Justice Department issued a report proposing
reforms to affirmative action programs used in federal procurement.'37 The
memorandum proposes the employment of "benchmarks" establishing the
desired level of minority participation in a given industry by calculating what
level of minority participation would exist in the industry absent
discrimination.'
The proposal sets out several potential programs which
employ racial preferences, such as bidding advantages, to bring the level of
minority participation up to the "ideal" level.'39 This new plan would leave
affirmative action programs in place, and in some instances even expand
present AA efforts. 4 °
The Justice Department memo has received some critical attention since
its issuance because, reports argue, the changes it recommends are not real
changes at all. One author writes that "between the lines there's an
unmistakable message: don't change a thing."''
Another writer criticizes
the new proposals as "no new thinking but a parade a euphemisms... 'goals
and timetables' become 'benchmarks,' and 'set-asides' become 'sheltered
bidding."' 142 It remains uncertain which of the new changes will be
implemented, and even less clear whether they could withstand judicial
review.
Clinton's 1995 proposed executive order discussed above mirrors in many
ways a draft bill introduced by Senator Christopher Bond (RepublicanMissouri). 43 Bond's proposal is also an empowerment strategy, and it
would direct that up to five percent of federal contracts be awarded to
companies located in Historically Underutilized Business Zones
(HUBZones).' A HUBZone would be defined as "a location in which at
least fifty percent of the households have an income of less than sixty percent
of the Area Median Gross Income for the most recent year for which census

137. 61 Fed. Reg. 26042 (1996).
138. 61 Fed. Reg. 26045 (1996).
139. 61 Fed. Reg. 26046 (1996).
140. For example, one report indicates the plan would expand the use of a ten
percent bid preference to minority contractors, now only used in defense contracting,
to all government procurements. David A. Price, Keeping Gov't Color-Conscious,
INVESTORS BUSINESS DAILY, June 4, 1996, at Al, availablein WESTLAW, 1996 WL
10195532.
141. Forster, supra note 136, at A17.
142. Clint Bolick, Rule of Lav: So Far,Clinton Can'tKick His QuotaAddiction,
THE WALL STREET JOURNAL, June 12, 1996, at A17.
143. Bond to Offer Bill to Create Race-Neutral and Gender Neutral Small
Business Programs,DAILY REPORT FOR EXECUTIVES, Dec. 15, 1995 at Section A, at
241, available in LEXIS, News Library, Drexec File.
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data are available."' 45 This legislation would not specifically replace the
section 8(a) program at issue in Adarand,but would come before that program
in priority. 4 6 The critical distinction between the Bond draft bill and
Clinton's proposed executive order is that to qualify under Bond's proposal
the business would also have to qualify as "small," whereas Clinton's proposal
gives no restrictions on the size of an otherwise qualified business. 47
Bond's proposal is not the only Republican measure under consideration
since Adarand. Republican presidential candidate, former Senator Bob Dole
(Republican-Kansas), and Representative Charles Canady (Republican-Florida)
co-sponsored a bill that would eliminate all race-basedAA programs in federal
contracting.'48 A House Judiciary subcommittee approved that bill on March
7, 1996. 49 Henry Hyde (Republican-Illinois), Chairman of the Judiciary
Committee,
stated that he hoped for a full Committee vote on the measure
",soon."150
Senator Bond's empowerment proposal will likely be used to
"complement the planned Republican rollback of affirmative-actionprograms"
such as the Dole-Canady measure.'
Taken together, these Republican
efforts could eliminate AA programs as they are presently known. Republican
presidential candidate Bob Dole has not stressed these efforts in his campaign,
but one report suggests that Dole will likely begin to emphasize his views on
AA programs, as "resentment of racial preferences... is strong among the 20
percent or so of voters who are most up for grabs in this year's presidential
,
race."152
The political branches are not alone in responding to the Adarand
decision. Perhaps the most drastic changes can be seen in the response by the
various administrative agencies, such as the Federal Communications
Commission, Department of Defense, Department of the Treasury, and the
National Aeronautics and Space Administration. All of these agencies have

145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Neil Munro, Rival Plan Threatens8(a) Firms,WASHINGTON TECHNOLOGY,
Feb. 8, 1996, available in WESTLAW, 1996 WL 8827040.
149. Nancy Montwieler, Affirmative Action: House Subcommittee Approves Bill
Barring Federal PreferentialTreatment, DAILY LABOR REPORT, March 8, 1996, at
D10 available in LEXIS, News Library, Dlabrt File.
150. Id.As of September 3, 1996, the provision had not yet been approved. See
Legislation: CongressReturnsfrom August Recess to ConsiderAppropriations, Labor

Bills, DAILY LABOR REPORT, Sept. 3, 1996, available in LEXIS, News Library, Dlabrt
File.
151. Montwieler, supra note 149, at D10.
152. The Affirmative Action Dilemma,supra note 129.
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issued regulations either soliciting comment or promulgating new rules in
order to continue their contracting programs in light of Adarand.
The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) has been very active in
responding to Adarand. The FCC removed race and gender preferences from
bidding procedures for wireless "spectrum-based" communicationtechnologies
in a final rule issued July 21, 1995.5 The FCC removed these preferences
to avoid litigation in direct response to Adarand.'54 A similar removal of
racial and gender preferences from the bidding process was implemented in
the auction of personal communication services.'
On September 21, 1995, the FCC issued final auction rules for 900 MHZ
Specialized Mobile Radio (SMR) services. 6 Under this regulation, the
FCC gave bidding preferences to "small businesses," defined as businesses
with average gross revenues over the preceding three years of $3 million or
less for one category or $15 million or less for another category. 7
Interestingly, this approach is similar to the empowerment contracting
approach proposed by the President and by former Senator Dole, which avoid
strict scrutiny by not employing racial classifications. 8
The FCC has also sought comment on a proposed rule which would
increase minority and gender-owned business involvement in the bidding for
lower 800 MHz SMR services."' The final rule that will be implemented
in this area is also likely to take an empowerment approach, as the regulation
commented that according to current census data, ninety-nine percent of
minority and women-owned businesses generate less than $1 million in annual
receipts."W This led the FCC to posit that virtually any definition it gave of
"small business" would encompass these businesses, hence having the effect
of giving them bidding preferences on the basis of economic classifications
rather than racial or gender classifications.'
In the paging services area, the FCC has also solicited comment on
whether, given the huge capital investment needed in the area, a program that
explicitly gave preference to minority and women-owned businesses could
pass strict scrutiny under Adarand.'62

153.
154.
155.
156.

60 Fed. Reg. 37786 (1995) (to be codified at 47 C.F.R. pts. 20, 24).
60 Fed. Reg. at 37787-87 (1995) (to be codified at 47 C.F.R. pts. 20, 24).
61 Fed. Reg. 33859 (1996) (to be codified at 47 C.F.R. pts. 20, 24).

60 Fed. Reg. 48913 (1995) (to be codified at 47 C.F.R. pt. 90).

157. 60 Fed. Reg. 48916 (1995) (to be codified at 47 C.F.R. pt. 90).

158. See supra notes 132-45 and accompanying text.
159. 61 Fed. Reg. 6212, 6227 (1996) (to be codified at 47 C.F.R. pt. 90).
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The Department of Defense has also responded to the Adarand decision.
On October 27, 1995, the Defense Department suspended one of its programs
which awarded contracts based upon racial preferences. 6 The suspended
program was known as section 1207,"4 or the "Rule of Two.' 6 Under
this rule, the Defense Department would reserve a contract for a Small
Disadvantaged Business (which were determined in part by racial
classifications) whenever two or more of these companies were eligible to bid
a on a contract." Despite this suspension, however, the Department of
Defense expressly encouraged contracting officials to continue to award
contracts under the section 8(a) program at issue in Adarand, and it has
proposed regulations that would increase minority preferences.' 67 Indeed,
the Defense Department promulgated a new rule on April 29, 1996, designed
to "limit the adverse impact" of the set-aside suspension. 68 This new
program requires the use of bidding preferences for minority and womenowned 69firms, and arguably runs counter to the intent of the Adarand
Court.

The Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs (OFCCP)
responded to Adarand by stating that it was not affected by the decision.17
The OFCCP enforces Executive Order 11246, a thirty-year-old measure
implemented by President Nixon, which requires companies awarded federal
contracts of $50,000 or more to establish and maintain written affirmative
action programs.' 7 Shirley J. Wilcher, Director of the OFCCP, stated that
since the order does not require decision-making based upon racial criteria, it
falls outside the reach of Adarand 72 It remains unclear if the director's
position would be tenable if challenged in court.
Other agencies that have responded include the Department of the
Treasury and the National Security Agency (NSA). The Director of the NSA
testified before Congress that he is modifying a program of that agency

163. 60 Fed. Reg. 54954 (1995) (to be codified at 47 C.F.R. pt. 73).
164. Reade & Maxwell, supra note 116, at B6.
165. DOD Suspends Use of 'Rule of Two,' Recommits to IncreasingAwards to
SDB's, DAILY REPORT FOR ExEcuTivEs, Oct. 24, 1995, at Section A, 205.
166. Id.
167. Reade & Maxwell, supra note 116, at B6.
168. 61 Fed. Reg. 18686 (1996) (to be codified at 48 C.F.R. pts. 217, 219, 236,
242, 252, 253).
169. 61 Fed. Reg. 18686 (1996) (to be codified at 48 C.F.R. pts. 217, 219, 236,
242, 252, 253).
170. OFCCP Offices Experiencing 'Interesting'Reaction to Court Case, DAILY
REPORT FOR ExEcuTIvEs, Sept. 19, 1995, Section A, at 181.
171. Id.
172. Id.
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designed to increase hiring of minority and female scientists to comply with
Adarand.173 The Department of the Treasury issued a final rule involving
the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) procurement
contracts." The regulation states that since the OCC focuses on outreach,
or increasing the applicant pool with qualified minority or female candidates
qualified candidates, its program is not impacted by
without excluding other
75
decision.
Adarand
the
The administrative agencies mentioned above seem to be taking various
steps to comply with, or sidestep, Adarand. Ultimately, the constitutionality
of these measures will be determined in the courts. The first case to hold a
federal racial preference program unconstitutional in light of Adarand was
76
Cornelius v. Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority,1
decided by a California state court. Another important case, however, was
heard by a Clinton appointee, Judge Emmit Sullivan, on March 8th.'77 The
case, brought by Dynalantic Corp., Deer Park, New Jersey, challenged the 8(a)
program at issue in Adarand in the context of a helicopter training device
contract set-aside. 178 The Department of Justice (DOJ) was supported in
defending the program by amicus briefs, including one filed by the National
Federation of 8(a) Companies. 179 The DOJ argued that the 8(a) programs
pass strict scrutiny under Adarand, making particular reference to Justice
O'Connor's reminder that strict scrutiny is not "fatal in fact."'80 Dynalantic
argued that the Court need not give special deference to Congress with the
section 8(a) programs because they are strictly federal in nature, hence falling
outside section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment which gives Congress powers
to regulate actions by the states.18' Additionally, Dynalantic argued that the
evidence of past discrimination put forward by the DOJ to support the
program was insufficient. 8 1 Ultimately, Dynalantic lost the litigation, as the
Judge Sullivan ruled that Dynalantic lacked standing to bring the action.' 83

173. Reade & Maxwell, supranote 116, at B6.
174. 60 Fed. Reg. 57315 (1995) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 9, 10, 11, 18).
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176. No. BC 101913, 1995 WL 499822 (Cal Super. Ct. July 27, 1995).
177. Munro, supra note 148.
178. Id.
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In another context, the Fifth Circuit has struck down the use of racial
classifications in University of Texas law school admissions.'84 The court
stated that the achievement of "diversity" was not a compelling governmental
interest sufficient to employ racial classifications in decision-making.'
This decision has caused much concern among college deans, as it could
signal the "beginning of the end" of the use of racial preferences in admission
decisions. 86 It caused concern for the Clinton administration as well, and
the administration voiced those concerns to the United States Supreme Court
in a memorandum asking the High Court to overturn the Fifth Circuit's
decision.'87 The Supreme Court ultimately denied certiorari.'88
Finally, minority businesses themselves seem to have been affected by the
Adarand decision. In the Chicago area, minority businesses reported that they
are being awarded fewer federal contracts since the decision.'89
Additionally, one report indicates that minority-owned defense contractors
have been awarded significantly fewer contracts 90since the Department of
Defense suspension of the "rule of two" program.
B. Analysis of the Impact of Adarand
From a legal standpoint, one potential impact of the Adarand decision in
lower courts is that benign, gender-based discrimination could pass scrutiny
more easily than a benign, race-based program.'
This is an anomalous
result, due to popular perception that, in the history of this country,
discrimination based upon race has been more severe than gender-based
discrimination. At least two lower courts, however, have mechanicallyapplied
the different standards of review in the race and gender context without
commenting on this apparent inconsistency. In both Baker v. United

184. Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct.
2581 (1996).
185. David E. Rovella, CircuitRuling Challenges 'Bakke, 'ThreatensLaw School
Diversity,THE NATIONAL LAW JOURNAL, April 1, 1996, at A15.
186. Id.
187. Linda Greenhouse, White House Asks Supreme Court to Review Affirmative
Action Ruling, Los ANGELES DAILY NEWS, May 25, 1996, at N17.
188. Texas v. Hopwood, 116 S. Ct. 2581 (1996).
189. Francine Knowles, Minority Firms Feel Court Rulings Effects, CHICAGO
SUN-TvES, Feb. 8, 1996, available in WESTLAW, 1996 WL 6730669.
190. Washington Insider,SET-ASIDE ALERT (Small Business Press, Washington,
D.C., July 29, 1996).
191. This is because race-based classifications are now subject to strict scrutiny,
whereas gender-based classifications are still subject to intermediate review.
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States"9 and Shuford v. Alabama State Board of Education93 the courts
applied strict scrutiny to the racial classification before it, while applying
intermediate review to the gender classification.
This anomalous application of the two standards of review has produced
commentary advocating that strict scrutiny should be applied to gender
classifications as well as racial classifications.'94 John Galotto correctly
points out that the rationale underlying the application of strict scrutiny to
racial classifications also applies to gender classifications. For instance, "the
concern... about legislative reliance on racial stereotypes applies with equal
force to gender stereotypes."1 95 Also, "whatever stigma the Croson court
felt would attach to the beneficiaries of racial preferences would likewise
afflict beneficiaries of gender preferences."' 96 The rigid application of
intermediate review to gender classifications in the lower courts will likely
cause criticism regarding post-Adarandaffirmative action jurisprudence.
In the political branches, the record seems to bear out President Clinton's
critics-his administration is doing everything within its power to continue
affirmative action programs as ifAdarand had never been decided."" The
most recent "reforms" recommended by the Justice Department are little more
than semantics, and what remains most important in the majority of federal
contracts is one's pigmentation. The Clinton administration perpetuates
outdated views on racial relations by ignoring the mandates, and the spirit, of
the Adarand decision. Jeff Jacoby, a writer for The New Orleans TimesPicayune,writes that:
the heart of Jim Crow beats on . . . [t]he belief that people are first and
foremost members of a race is alive and well and living under the rubric
"affirmative action"-or, as we now call it, "diversity." . .. Only if the
most meaningful thing about each of us is our pigmentation can the quotas
and preferences of affirmative action-or the segregated railway cars ofJim
Crow-make sense. 98
The most noxious result of the continuation of affirmative action
programs for the achievement of diversity, so as to ensure that all perspectives

192. 1995 WL 746559 (Ct. Cl. December 12, 1995).
193. 897 F. Supp. 1535 (M.D. Ala. 1995).
194. See John Galotto, StrictScrutinyfor Gender,via Croson, 93 COLUM. L. REV.
508 (1993).
195. Id. at 536.
196. Id.
197. See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
198. Jeff Jacoby, We're Still Counting by Race 100 Years after Plessy, THE NEW
ORLEANS TIMES-PICAYUNE, April 27, 1996, at B7.
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are represented, is the reinforcement of the bigot's belief structure-that there
is a "black"1 way of thinking and a "white" way of thinking. Jeff Jacoby
writes that this leads to the logic that "above all else, we are black or we are
white... [k]now a man's color, and you know how he thinks, how he acts,
what he wants, what he is.""' This result runs counter to the good
intentions of the people designing AA programs, but everyone knows what
road good intentions pave.
More than seventy percent of Americans polled today oppose racial
preferences."° As one author states, this opposition is not "evidence of
growing racism... [t]he concept that rights are rooted in each individual, not
in any group, is fundamental to the American creed."2' ' If set-asides, or
"benchmarks," are to continue, racial criteria should be cast aside and
economic factors should be employed to determine eligibility for assistance
programs. This would enable the administrators of such programs to better
identify the companies that need the assistance, regardless of the demographics
of their owners. Public perception of such programs could only become more
favorable as a result. Programs such as those proposed by Senator Bond,"2
which have an economic focus, would increase the perception of legitimacy
of government set-aside programs. Consequently, Americans from all racial
backgrounds will be able to see the good coming from such classifications.
Further, as the FCC noted, virtually any definition of "small business" would
include the racial and gender groups currently singled out for assistance. 3
We are a nation of Americans. There was a time when AA programs
were necessary to ensure that we, as Americans, believed that we were one
nation of diverse citizenship. Today, the continuation of such programs only
serves to reinforce the racial divide in this country-something our
government should be loathe to do. The United States government helping
small, start-up companies in less-than-prosperous communities is admirable;
that same government helping citizens based solely on their racial background
is troublesome. The employment of economic criteria for the determination of
eligibility for government set-asides will help Americans of all races who need
the assistance, and if widely used it could come a long way toward aiding the
relations between the races in this country.
Classifications based on race are a constant reminder of the division
among the American population. Economic classifications could serve the
same goals of current affirmative action programs without such a reminder.

199. Id
200. The Affirmative Action Dilemma, supra note 129, at A2.
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Indeed, the economic classifications may be more proficient in serving those
goals-giving aid to those who need it. It is time that the citizens of the
United States begin to see ourselves as the rest of the world views us-as
Americans.
V. CONCLUSION
The controversy over affirmative action will undoubtedly continue in the
post-Adarand world. Affirmative action seeks to put races victimized in the
past where they would have been absent such treatment. The problem is no
one can know "where" that is. Thus, the proportional representation
assumption of modem affirmative action programs is flawed." 4 Adarand
has set the stage for a battle on affirmative action not just in the courts, but
also in the executive branch, Congress, and state governments. It is uncertain
whether the Court has signalled that affirmative action has reached its highwater mark in this country, but it is clear that the Clinton administration is not
listening to any message the Court may be trying to send. As long as tension
exists between what is politically "popular" and what is constitutionally
permissible, the disregard for the Adarand decision by the political branches
will likely continue.
The continuing emphasis of race and ethnicity by the state and federal
governments only serves to increase the racial divide in this country.
Distributing benefits on such a basis undeniably increases racial tensions and
stigmatizes all of the individuals eligible to be "beneficiaries" of the program,
whether they actually received assistance or not. Despite the best of intentions
on the part of affirmative action program supporters, the programs fail to do
what civil rights activists originally intended-to ensure that individuals are
given a fair chance regardless of their racial background. It is time that
supporters of affirmative action in the United States contemplate the oftquoted statement describing self-defeating behavior-"We have met the
enemy, and he is us."2 5
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